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GENETICS AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE PERSONAL
BELINDA BENNETT*
The shared nature of genetic information presents new challenges for legal 
understandings of the self. Within traditional legal discourses the individual 
is conceptualised as separate and autonomous. In contrast, the genetic 
individual is understood as inherently relational. This paper analyses the 
transformation of our understandings of the personal. The transformative 
processes are assessed through discussion of the changing meanings of 
privacy in the context of genetic information within families; changing 
views over access to information about biological parentage by children 
conceived through assisted reproductive technology; preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis and the changing context of reproductive decision-
making. 
I GENETICS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
PERSONAL
The mapping of the human genome has opened a range of new possibilities for 
genetic research and new treatments for disease and genetic conditions. These 
possibilities have also been accompanied by ethical and legal challenges. Many 
of these challenges have involved resolving questions about the boundaries 
between the rights of individuals and others to genetic information. Increasingly, 
we must face the legal and ethical challenges associated with the shared nature 
of genetic information and the meaning of genetic privacy, particularly in the 
context of disclosure of genetic information to family members. Genetics is 
also creating a new impetus for information about biological parentage by 
individuals who were conceived using donated gametes, highlighting the role of 
genetics in contemporary understandings of personal identity. Finally, genetics is 
transforming the realm of reproductive decision-making by providing prospective 
parents with an increasing amount of information about their embryos, and, when 
combined with reproductive technologies, new possibilities for choosing between 
embryos on the basis of their characteristics.
Within each of these areas the meaning of ‘personal information’ is a key issue. 
Within all of these areas of debate, the common theme is one of the balance 
between the individual and the community, between private and public interests 
and questions of who has the right to regulate both access to and the use of that 
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information. What is apparent in the debates over genetic information is that 
our understandings of what is personal and private are being transformed by 
the shared nature of genetic information, by the needs of individuals for access 
to information, and by our own desires to know more about ourselves and our 
families. In each of these areas, the realm of the personal, and of the self, is being 
reworked by a dialogue between the personal and the genetic. Increasingly, the 
genetic self emerges as an inherently relational individual who exists in contrast 
to idealised and individualised legal subjects.
II GENETIC PRIVACY
In the late 1990s and early 2000s much of the debate about law and genetics 
centred on issues of genetic privacy. To a large degree these debates were 
infl uenced by the recognition of the potential for genetics to provide signifi cant 
information about an individual’s current or future health and for this information 
to be of potential relevance to an individual’s employment or insurance. The 
issue of genetic privacy was therefore closely linked with concerns about genetic 
discrimination. In one sense, the use of medical information for employment or 
insurance purposes was not new. Doctors and insurers have long used family 
medical histories to identify patients at risk of developing particular conditions. 1 
However, genetic information promised to be more detailed and less uncertain 
than family medical histories. It also brought with it the potential to identify 
individuals at risk before they became unwell. Concern began to be expressed 
about the ‘presymptomatically ill’2 being labelled as unwell or at risk when they 
may never in fact develop the condition in question. Indeed, while genetic science 
seems to offer certainty, in fact, the information it provides is far more nuanced, 
for the meaning of a particular gene or genetic mutat ion for an individual’s health 
will depend upon the penetrance3 of that gene.
Genetic information is very appealing. It is scientifi c, somewhat mysterious to 
those of us who do not have scientifi c backgrounds, and it appears to offer a 
certainty for the conclusions we may draw from it. However, as the reminder 
about gene penetrance shows, genetic information is often more probabilistic 
than predictive. The current fascination with all things genetic and the apparent 
certainty offered by genetic information can lead towards what has been termed 
‘genetic essentialism’ and the assumption that people really are simply a product 
of their genes.4 If we assume that genetic information is predictive and attribute 
more certainty to it than we should, there is a risk that individuals who will never 
develop the condition will be discriminated against. Certainly, concerns have 
been expressed about the potential for individuals to be disadvantaged in the 
1 Australian Law Reform Commission (‘ALRC’), Essentially Yours: The Protection of Human Genetic 
Information in Australia, Report No 96 (2003) [3.3].
2 Rochelle Dreyfuss and Dorothy Nelkin, ‘The Jurisprudence of Genetics’ (1992) 45 Vanderbilt Law 
Review 313, 318.
3 ALRC, above n 1, [2.24]–[2.27].
4 Dreyfuss and Nelkin, above n 2, 320–1.
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context of employment and in the context of applications for insurance,5 with one 
recent article reporting verifi ed cases of genetic discrimination.6
Given the sensitivity of genetic information, individuals clearly have an interest 
in ensuring that the privacy of their genetic information is maintained. However, 
the meaning of this interest and of any rights that might pertain to it is far less 
certain. Information about health, disease and risk that once seemed to be 
personal information, relating only to the individual in question, is no longer 
regarded as purely personal. Two trends are evident here. First is the way in which 
the individual, in being geneticised, becomes an object of scrutiny. The corporeal 
bounds of the body dissolve in the face of medical monitoring and observation. 
Evident in this process is the emergence of a new way of living in which, as 
Nikolas Rose explains: 
once diagnosed with susceptibilities the responsible asymptomatic 
individual is enrolled for a life sentence in the world of medicine – of 
tests, of drugs, of self-examination and self-defi nition as a ‘prepatient’ 
suffering from a protosickness. And, in the near future, perhaps, they will 
subject themselves to new forms of monitoring that engender a new ethical 
relation to the self.7
The second transformation of the personal occurs in the boundaries between 
the individual and the familial. Increasingly, genetic information is regarded as 
intrinsically familial. This is because genetic information about an individual 
also reveals information about the individual’s family members. Thus the move 
from (broad) medical information to (specifi c) genetic information has been 
associated with a move from the private/individual to the (more) public/familial. 
These families are bound together through a common link of genetic alterations, 
forming what Dolgin refers to as the ‘medicalized family’.8
This understanding of the genetic as no longer intrinsically individual and private 
does represent a clear shift in the ways we conceptualise medical information. 
Obligations of confi dentiality for health professionals embodied in codes of 
ethics and legal obligations of confi dentiality through either statute or common 
law have traditionally reinforced the individual and non-public nature of medical 
5 Kristine Barlow-Stewart and David Keays, ‘Genetic Discrimination in Australia’ (2001) 8 Journal 
of Law and Medicine 250; Margaret Otlowski, ‘Avoiding Genetic Discrimination in Insurance: An 
Exploration of the Legality and Ethics of Precautionary Measures in Anticipation of Unfavourable Test 
Outcomes’ (2001) 20 Monash Bioethics Review 24; Susan Wolf, ‘Beyond “Genetic Discrimination”: 
Toward the Broader Harm of Geneticism’ (1995) 23 Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 345; Sandra 
Taylor et al, ‘Investigating Genetic Discrimination in Australia: Perceptions and Experiences of Clinical 
Genetic Service Clients Regarding Coercion to Test, Insurance and Employment’ (2007) 5 Australian 
Journal of Emerging Technologies and Society 63.
6 Kristine Barlow-Stewart et al, ‘Verifi cation of Consumers’ Experiences and Perceptions of Genetic 
Discrimination and Its Impact on Utilization of Genetic Testing’ (2009) 11 Genetics in Medicine 193.
7 Nikolas Rose, The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the Twenty-fi rst 
Century (2007) 94.
8 Janet Dolgin, ‘Biological Evaluations: Blood, Genes and Family’ (2008) 41 Akro n Law Review 347, 
389.
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information.9 In recent decades the growing use of computers, databases and 
the internet has raised awareness of the importance of privacy protections and 
increasingly privacy laws and guidelines have sought to protect individuals from 
intrusions on their privacy and disclosure of personal information. Indeed, it is 
this broader context for privacy that provides some of the impetus to the genetic 
privacy debates.
The inclusion of genetics within privacy laws is far from straightforward. First of 
all, there is the question of whether genetic privacy should be protected through 
the enactment of specifi c genetic privacy laws, or whether it should be protected 
by amending existing privacy laws. Special genetic privacy laws have been 
criticised as ‘genetic exceptionalism’ – an approach that sees genetics, and the 
issues raised by genetics, as somehow different from the privacy issues raised 
in other areas.10 This is always a challenge when deciding how the law should 
respond to new technologies.11 There is much to be said for adapting existing laws 
so that they include and cover new technologies generally rather than continually 
crafting new, specifi c laws for each new technology that emerges – a response 
which risks what Derek Morgan calls ‘the Red Queen defence: forever rushing to 
stay in one place’.12 However, even the task of amending existing laws is often a 
challenging one.
Privacy law is concerned with our control over the ways that our personal 
information is used. Existing laws are generally written for records, either 
written or electronic. How does genetic information fi t within this framework?13 
In Australia the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (‘Privacy Act’) now includes genetic 
information in the defi nition of health information for the purposes of the Act.14 
In New South Wales the Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 
(NSW) defi nes ‘personal information’ to include ‘such things as an individual’s 
fi ngerprints, retina prints, body samples or genetic characteristics’15 and also 
includes genetic characteristics within the defi nition of ‘health information’.16 The 
Health Records Act 2001 (Vic) also includes ‘other personal information that is 
genetic information about an individual in a form which is or could be predictive 
of the health (at any time) of the individual or any of his or her descendants’ 
9 For discussion of obligations of confi dentiality in the context of health care see Janine McIlwraith and 
Bill Madden, Health Care & the Law (4th ed, 2006) ch 7; Loane Skene, Law and Medical Practice: 
Rights, Duties, Claims and Defences (3rd ed, 2008) ch 9.
10 For discussion see ALRC, above n 1, [3.41]–[3.55].
11 See Belinda Bennett, Health Law’s Kaleidoscope: Health Law Rights in a Global Age (2008) ch 1; 
Roger Brownsword, Rights, Regulation, and the Technological Revolution (2008).
12 Derek Morgan, Issues in Medical Law and Ethics (2001) 37.
13 For discussion see ALRC, above n 1, [8.4] – [8.13].
14 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 6: The defi nition of ‘health information’ includes ‘genetic information about 
an individual in a form that is, or could be, predictive of the health of the individual or a genetic relative 
of the individual’.
15 Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW) s 5(2).
16 Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW) s 6: The defi nition of ‘health information’ 
includes ‘other personal information that is genetic information about an individual arising from a health 
service provided to the individual in a form that is or could be predictive of the health (at any time) of 
the individual or of any sibling, relative or descendant of the individual’.
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within the defi nition of ‘health information’.17 In contrast, the Australian Capital 
Territory’s Health Records (Privacy and Access) Act 1997 (ACT) does not 
expressly include genetic information within the defi nition of a ‘record’.
The traditional boundaries of privacy around the individual have been blurred 
somewhat by our understandings of the shared nature of genetic information, and 
the rights or interests of family members to know the results of genetic testing 
that may be of relevance to them.18 This raises a series of complex matters about 
the meaning of privacy in a context where medical information is understood 
to ‘belong’ to more than one person: about how best to protect privacy in these 
circumstances and about how best to provide information based on genetic test 
results to biological relatives. 19 Information about an individual can be provided 
to a family member with the individual’s consent. However, if an individual 
does not agree to a family member being provided with genetic information, as 
can sometimes happen, 20 can a doctor or other health professional provide that 
information?21 It is important to note that non-disclosure of genetic information 
within families is not necessarily due to poor family connections or a lack of care 
about the implications of the results for relatives. On the contrary, individuals 
may be reluctant or unsure about disclosing genetic information to relatives out 
of concern for the distress or harm that the information may bring.22
In Australia, disclosure of personal information is regulated at the federal level 
by the Privacy Act. Many States and Territories also have privacy legislation, 
some specifi cally relating to health information and records.23 The Privacy Act 
contains a number of Information Privacy Principles (‘IPPs’) and National Privacy 
Principles (‘NPPs’) which govern the collection, use, storage and disclosure of 
personal information. These provisions essentially impose strict limitations on 
disclosure of personal information without consent. The circumstances in which 
disclosure of information is permitted without consent are limited24 but include 
a provision permitting disclosure if it is necessary to lessen or prevent ‘a serious 
17 Health Records Act 2001 (Vic) s 3.
18 ALRC, above n 1, [3.25].
19 For debate on these issues see Dean Bell and Belinda Bennett, ‘Genetic Secrets and the Family’ (2001) 
9 Medical Law Review 130; Loane Skene, ‘Genetic Secrets and the Family: A Response to Bell and 
Bennett’ (2001) 9 Medical Law Review 162; Roy Gilbar, ‘Medical Confi dentiality within the Family: 
The Doctor’s Duty Reconsidered’ (2004) 18 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 195; 
Agata Bober, ‘Passing It On: Should Health Care Professionals Be Permitted to Disclose Patients’ 
Genetic Information to Their Reproductive Partners?’ (2006) 14 Journal of Law and Medicine 262.
20 Angus Clarke et al, ‘Genetic Professionals’ Reports of Nondisclosure of Genetic Risk Information 
within Families’ (2005) 13 European Journal of Human Genetics 556, 560: Clarke et al found that less 
than one percent of genetic clinic consultations were associated with non-disclosure and that, based on 
second-hand evidence from professionals, the most common reason for non-disclosure was the desire to 
protect relatives from anxiety.
21 Bell and Bennett, above n 19; Skene, ‘Genetic Secrets and the Family: A Response to Bell and Bennett’, 
above n 19; Gilbar, above n 19; Béatrice Godard et al, ‘Guidelines for Disclosing Genetic Information 
to Family Members: From Development to Use’ (2006) 5 Familial Cancer 103.
22 Clarke et al, above n 20; Nina Hallowell et al, ‘Balancing Autonomy and Responsibility: The Ethics of 
Generating and Disclosing Genetic Information’ (2003) 29 Journal of Medical Ethics 74.
23 See, eg, Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW); Health Records Act 2001 (Vic); 
Health Records (Privacy and Access) Act 1997 (ACT). 
24 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) sch 3 s 2.1.
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and imminent threat to an individual’s life, health or safety’.25 Most genetic 
conditions would be unlikely to satisfy the test of being a ‘serious and imminent 
threat’ since most would take time to become apparent.26 
In response to the recommendations of the Australian Law Reform Commission 
in its Essentially Yours Report,27 the Australian government passed amendments 
to the Privacy Act. The amendments include a new provision in the NPPs: sch 3 
s 2.1(ea), permitting disclosure by an organisation that has obtained the genetic 
information in the course of providing a health service to an individual where: 
the organisation reasonably believes that the use or disclosure is necessary 
to lessen or prevent a serious threat to the life, health or safety (whether or 
not the threat is imminent) of an individual who is a genetic relative of the 
individual to whom the genetic information relates.28
The disclosure must also be in accordance with guidelines to be issued by the 
National Health and Medical Research Council (‘NHMRC’) and approved by the 
Privacy Commissioner under a new s 95AA of the Privacy Act and, in the case 
of a disclosure, the recipient of the information must be the individual’s genetic 
relative.29 While these amendments only affect potential liability for breach of the 
provisions of the Privacy Act and do not provide immunity from common law 
actions for breach of confi dentiality,30 the amendments are indicative of a move 
towards a redefi ning of genetic information from the personal to the familial. As 
Margaret Otlowski has commented: 
this process of legislative change, and the inevitable discussion that it 
will generate, are likely to raise awareness regarding these issues and 
ultimately promote an environment in which disclosure is brought within 
the mainstream of accepted, even expected, clinical practice.31
In February 2008 the NHMRC issued a Consultation Draft of guidelines for 
health practitioners on disclosure of genetic information to a patient’s genetic 
relatives under s 95AA of the Privacy Act.32 Importantly, the Consultation Draft 
guidelines require that:
 ● ‘Reasonable steps should be taken to obtain the patient’s consent to disclose 
genetic information to at-risk genetic relatives’;33 
25 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) sch 3 s 2.1(e)(i).
26 ALRC, above n 1, [21.66].
27 ALRC, above n 1.
28 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) sch 3 s 2.1(ea)(i).
29 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) sch 3 s 2.1(ea), amended by Privacy Legislation Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) sch 
2 s 4. 
30 Margaret Otlowski, ‘Disc losure of Genetic Information to At-risk Relatives: Recent Amendments to the 
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)’ (2007) 187 Medical Journal of Australia 398, 399.
31 Ibid.
32 National Health and Medical Research Council (‘NHMRC’), Disclosure of Genetic Information to a 
Patient’s Genetic Relatives under Section 95AA of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth): Guidelines for Health 
Practitioners in the Private Sector, Consultation Draft (2008) (‘Consultation Draft’).
33 Ibid 25.
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 ● ‘[d]isclosure of genetic information without consent may proceed only if a 
serious threat to the life, health or safety of genetic relatives exists’;34 and 
 ● disclosure is ‘necessary to lessen or prevent a serious threat to the life, health 
or safety of genetic relative’.35
The guidelines in the Consultation Draft would not require health professionals to 
disclose genetic information to a patient’s genetic relatives but set out a framework 
to be followed if they do decide to make a disclosure. Indeed, if a practitioner 
seeks to rely on the provisions of the Privacy Act in making the disclosure, then 
it would be necessary to follow the guidelines.36 As the 2008 guidelines are only 
a consultation draft, when the fi nal guidelines are released we will have some 
useful guidance for health professionals in this area.
While the issue of disclosure of genetic information to relatives raises questions 
about the rights of relatives to genetic knowledge, it also paradoxically raises the 
issue of whether there is a right not to know. The centrality of autonomy discourses 
to bioethics and health law in the West would tend to support the concept of a 
right not to know genetic information. UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on the 
Human Genome and Human Rights37 supports this right, stating in article 5c: 
‘The right of each individual to decide whether or not to be informed of the results 
of genetic examination and the resulting consequences should be respected’. 
But how important is the right not to know?38 Does being told familial genetic 
information undermine one’s right to be free of such knowledge? Can genetic 
information potentially limit the horizons of one’s future? Much will depend on 
the individual and on the genetic condition in question. One may, for example, 
prefer not to have information about one’s genetic status, if the condition in 
question is serious and incurable, but prefer to be given genetic information, if 
the condition is one that could be treated. 
The real diffi culty with the right not to know is that the moment the issue of 
genetic information is raised with the person, they are made aware that genetic 
results exist and one can no longer say that the individual does not know. On the 
other hand, if the person is told nothing, then their ability to make a choice is also 
compromised. Of course, a person may have already made their wishes known to 
their doctor or family members, particularly in the case of inherited conditions 
where there may have been some discussion in the family. Graeme Laurie has 
also suggested that a number of other factors may be relevant to the decision of 
whether to disclose information. These include:
 ● the availability of treatment or cure for the condition;
 ● the severity of the condition and likelihood of its onset;
34 Ibid 31.
35 Ibid 33.
36 Ibid 7.
37 United Nations Educational, Scientifi c and Cultural Organization (‘UNESCO’), Universal Declaration 
on the Human Genome and Human Rights, 29th plen mtg, Res 31 (1997).
38 Jane Wilson, ‘To Know or Not to Know? Genetic Ignorance, Autonomy and Paternalism’ (2005) 19 
Bioethics 492.
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 ● the nature of genetic testing the individual might need to undergo;
 ● the nature of the information to be disclosed, eg how certain is it;
 ● the nature of the request; and 
 ● the views and likely reaction of the person that the information will be 
disclosed to.39 
The concept of the right not to know shows just how challenging it is to identify 
and articulate our genetic privacy interests in advance.
III GENETICS AND THE DEFINITION OF FAMILY
While modern genetics has impacted on our understandings of illness and led to 
broader understandings of privacy which move beyond the individual to include 
the family, genetics has also fed into our desires for information about who we 
are related to. This trend is most evident in the move, apparent in recent years, to 
allow individuals who were conceived using donated gametes to gain access to 
information about their biological parentage. This point should not be overstated. 
After all, when we think about the historical links between paternity and 
inheritance,40 it is clear that there is nothing new about concerns over biological 
parentage while the popularity of genealogical research shows that we have an 
enduring interest in knowing who we are related to. 
The combination of genetics and reproductive technologies has added a new 
angle to these issues. The use of donated sperm, eggs and embryos allows social 
and biological parentage to be separated. For children who were conceived using 
donated reproductive material (typically, donated sperm), their wish to obtain 
information about their biological parent echoes calls by adopted children for 
information about their birth parents. While there are these similarities with 
adoption, there are also obvious differences. The most obvious difference is that 
children conceived through artifi cial fertilisation techniques are generally related 
to one of their birth parents. However, like many adopted children, children 
conceived through artifi cial fertilisation may not be told the truth about their 
biological parentage. 
Traditionally, donor insemination was characterised by secrecy and the statutory 
schemes regulating this area did not provide rights to information about biological 
parentage for children conceived using donated gametes, nor were rights to 
information about biological offspring given to those who donated gametes for 
use in artifi cial fertilisation programs. Over time in Australia and overseas, we 
39 Graeme Laurie, Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to Medico-legal Norms (2002) 261–4. For further 
discussion on the right not to know see Rosalind McDougall, ‘Rethinking the “Right Not to Know”’ 
(2004) 23 Monash Bioethics Review 22.
40 Carol Smart, ‘“There Is of Course the Distinction Dictated by Nature”: Law and the Problem of 
Paternity’ in Michelle Stanworth (ed), Reproductive Technologies: Gender, Motherhood and Medicine 
(1987) 98, 99.
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have seen a dramatic change in the laws and policies in this area. In part, change 
in this area has echoed changes in openness in the area of adoption.41 In part too, 
it is in line with greater recognition of children’s rights42 and with the increasing 
social acceptance of assisted reproductive technology (‘ART’) which has lessened 
the pressures for secrecy. Despite this growing trend, the international literature 
continues to show that many parents do not tell their children the truth about their 
biological parentage.43 Within this debate about openness, there are also concerns 
that donors may be unwilling to donate if they are unable to do so anonymously.
The regulation of reproductive technology in Australia is an example of the 
effects of federalism on the provision and regulation of health care in Australia. 
Under the Constitution there are very few powers relating to health that are given 
to the Commonwealth. Most powers relating to health therefore fall to the States. 
There has been some federal harmonisation of laws relevant to ART but this 
has been largely limited to the laws relating to stem cell research and cloning 
technologies, where there is a comprehensive framework of legislation at the 
Commonwealth and State level.44 Only four States have legislation regulating 
the provision of ART: (1) Victoria, which fi rst introduced legislation in the 
early 1980s,45 then in 1995,46 and last year passed new legislation, the Assisted 
Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) (‘Victorian Act’); (2) South Australia;47 
(3) Western Australia;48 and, most recently, (4) New South Wales.49 For those 
States without such legislation, the NHMRC’s Ethical Guidelines on the Use of 
Assisted Reproductive Technology in Clinical Practice and Research50 (‘NHMRC 
Guidelines’) provide ethical guidance. Furthermore, although the NHMRC 
41 Erica Haimes, ‘“Secrecy”: What Can Artifi cial Reproduction Learn from Adoption?’ (1988) 2 
International Journal of Law and the Family 46. For further discussion of legal and social trends 
towards openness and access to information about biological parentage see Bennett, above n 11, ch 2.
42 Kerry Petersen, ‘The Rights of Donor-conceived Children to Know the Identity of Their Donor: The 
Problem of the Known Unknowns and the Unknown Unknowns’ in Belinda Bennett and George 
Tomossy (eds), Globalization and Health: Challenges for Health Law and Bioethics (2006) 155–7; John 
Tobin, The Convention on the Rights of the Child: The Rights and Best Interests of Children Conceived 
through Assisted Reproduction (2004).
43 Infertility Treatment Authority, Donor Conception: Parents Disclosing Donor Conception to Their 
Children: What Does the Literature Tell Us? (2006).
44 Research Involving Human Embryos Act 2002 (Cth); Prohibition of Human Cloning for Reproduction 
Act 2002 (Cth); Human Cloning for Reproduction and Other Prohibited Practices Act 2003 (NSW); 
Research Involving Human Embryos (New South Wales) Act 2003 (NSW); Infertility Treatment Act 
1995 (Vic); Research Involving Human Embryos and Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2003 (Qld); 
Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2003 (SA); Research Involving Human Embryos Act 2003 (SA); 
Human Cloning for Reproduction and Other Prohibited Practices Act 2003 (Tas); Human Embryonic 
Research Regulation Act 2003 (Tas); Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991 (WA); Human Cloning 
and Embryo Research Act 2004 (ACT).
45 Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act 1984 (Vic).
46 Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic).
47 Reproductive Technology (Clinical Practices) Act 1988 (SA).
48 Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991 (WA).
49 Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2007 (NSW). See also Malcolm Smith, ‘Reviewing Regulation 
of Assisted Reproductive Technology in New South Wales: The Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 
2007 (NSW)’ (2008) 16 Journal of Law and Medicine 120.
50 NHMRC, Ethical Guidelines on the Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology in Clinical Practice and 
Research (2007).
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Guidelines are only guidelines, their force is strengthened by the fact that the 
Reproductive Technology Accreditation Committee (‘RTAC’) of the Fertility 
Society of Australia requires adherence to the NHMRC Guidelines as a condition 
of accreditation,51 while some States also expressly require compliance with the 
NHMRC Guidelines within their legislative frameworks.52 
Although the regulation of ART in Australia has been, and continues to be, a 
patchwork of legislation and guidelines,53 there has been a considerable degree 
of uniformity in terms of addressing the legal status of children conceived using 
donated eggs and sperm. In all Australian States and Territories, there is legislation 
on the status of children conceived through artifi cial fertilisation procedures.54 
There are some variations between the provisions; however, the basic effect 
of them is to create parentage presumptions such that the sperm donor is not 
regarded as the legal father of a child conceived using donated sperm. Instead, 
the husband of the woman who underwent the fertilisation procedure with his 
consent is regarded as the child’s legal father. If a donated egg is used, then the 
egg donor is not regarded as the child’s legal mother. Instead, it is the birth mother 
who is regarded as the child’s legal mother. The effect of these provisions is to 
support the position of the child’s social parents and has traditionally been seen 
as being in the best interests of the family. As the Warnock Committee in the UK 
noted in its 1984 Report, the presumption of paternity for the ‘social’ father was 
‘consistent with the husband’s assuming all parental rights and duties with regard 
to the child’.55 These provisions gave the family the appearance of normality 
and the anonymity of the donor ensured that the family’s ‘non-conformity 
cannot be manifested in the form of a real, living person’.56 However, although 
these presumptions remain, there is a growing trend towards openness, both in 
Australia and overseas. This openness includes greater recognition of the rights of 
51 Reproductive Technology Accreditation Committee, Fertility Society of Australia, Code of Practice for 
Assisted Reproductive Technology Units (2008) critical criteria 1. See also Don Chalmers, ‘Professional 
Self-regulation and Guidelines in Assisted Reproduction’ (2002) 9 Journal of Law and Medicine 
414; Douglas Saunders, ‘The Australian Experience of Self-Accreditation’ in Jennifer Gunning and 
Helen Szoke (eds), The Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technology (2003); Kerry Petersen et al, 
‘Assisted Reproductive Technologies: Professional and Legal Restrictions in Australian Clinics’ (2005) 
12 Journal of Law and Medicine 373.
52 Infertility Treatment Authority (‘ITA’), Conditions for Licence (8th ed, 2008) [1.3]. The ITA is established 
pursuant to the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic) pt 9; Reproductive Technology (Code of Ethical 
Clinical Practice) Regulations 1995 (SA) sch cl 2A.
53 Helen Szoke, ‘Australia – A Federated Structure of Statutory Regulation of ART’ in Jennifer Gunning 
and Helen Szoke (eds), The Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technology (2003) 75.
54 Status of Children Act 1996 (NSW) s 14; Status of Children Act 1974 (Vic) s 10D; Family Relationships 
Act 1975 (SA) ss 10D, 10E; Status of Children Act 1974 (Tas) s 10C; Status of Children Act 1978 (Qld) 
s 16; Artifi cial Conception Act 1985 (WA) s 6; Parentage Act 2004 (ACT) s 11; Status of Children Act 
1978 (NT) s 5D; Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60H.
55 Dame Mary Warnock, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, 
Cmnd 9314 (1984) [4.25].
56 Erica Haimes, ‘Recreating the Family? Policy Consideration Relating to the “New” Reproductive 
Technologies’ in Maureen McNeil, Ian Varcoe and Steven Yearley (eds), The New Reproductive 
Technologies (1990) 160.
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same-sex couples and legislative changes to parentage laws permitting a woman’s 
same-sex partner to be listed as the second parent on a child’s birth certifi cate.57
The NHMRC Guidelines provide clear support for openness and honesty within 
the family about biological origins. Paragraph 6.1 states:
Persons conceived using ART procedures are entitled to know their genetic 
parents. Clinics must not use donated gametes in reproductive procedures 
unless the donor has consented to the release of identifying information 
about himself or herself to the persons conceived using his or her gametes. 
Clinics must not mix gametes in a way that confuses the genetic parentage 
of the persons who are born.58
In addition, paragraph 6.1.2 lends further support to this, stating:
Clinics should help prospective recipients to understand the signifi cant 
biological connection that their children have with the gamete donor. 
Recipients should be advised that their children are entitled to knowledge 
of their genetic parents and siblings; they should therefore be encouraged 
to tell their children about their origins.59
Each of the States with legislation regulating assisted conception has provisions 
addressing the issue of access to information when donated gametes have been 
used. In each State, the gamete donor and an adult donor offspring are entitled 
to apply for access to information about each other.60 Yet, this move to openness 
has been a gradual one. The transformation in social attitudes towards openness 
about gamete donation is evident in the legislative changes in Victoria, which 
has had legislation governing ART for the longest period of any Australian 
jurisdiction. Identifying information is released if the gametes were donated 
after 31 December 1997; or if they were donated between 1 July 1988 and 31 
December 1997 and the donor has consented to the disclosure.61 Between July 
1988 and December 1997, donors were able to indicate, at the time of donation, 
whether they consented to identifying information about them being released to 
their offspring in the future. Since then, all donors have been made aware, at the 
time of donation, that identifying information about them might be released in 
the future.62 Prior to 1988 donations were anonymous so the Register does not 
hold identifying information about donors. The Victorian Act will also facilitate 
access to information for donors and children of donor conception. Importantly, 
one of the fi ve guiding principles in the new Act is that ‘children born as a result 
57 Artifi cial Conception Act 1985 (WA) s 6A; Status of Children Act (NT) s 5DA; Parentage Act 2004 
(ACT) s 11(4); Status of Children Act 1974 (Vic) ss 11-13.
58 NHMRC, above n 50, [6.1].
59 Ibid [6.1.2].
60 Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) s 59(a)(ii); Reproductive Technology (Clinical 
Practices) Act 1988 (SA) s 18(1); Reproductive Technology (Code of Ethical Clinical Practice) 
Regulations 1995 (SA) cl 36; Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991 (WA) s 49(2); Assisted 
Reproductive Technology Act 2007 (NSW) s 37(1). For discussion of the New South Wales legislation, 
see Julie Hamblin, ‘Anonymity of IVF Donors in NSW’ (2008) 88 Precedent 36.
61 Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) s 59(b).
62 Explanatory Memorandum, Assisted Reproductive Treatment Bill 2008 (Vic) cl 59.
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of the use of donated gametes have a right to information about their genetic 
parents.’63 
In Victoria, the fi rst in-vitro fertilization (‘IVF’) donor-conceived children began 
to turn 18 in 2006 and were then eligible to apply for information without their 
parents’ consent. If the Infertility Treatment Authority (‘ITA’) contacted one of 
these young adults after receiving a request from a donor, there was a risk that 
that could be the fi rst time the young adult found out that they were conceived 
through a donor program. In order to address this dilemma, the ITA has been 
running a public awareness campaign, called ‘Time to Tell’, to raise awareness of 
the rights of individuals involved in donor conception and to provide support for 
individuals involved in donor programs.64
Evident within the move to openness about gamete donation is recognition 
that the interests of others sometimes outweigh the interests of the individual. 
As discussed above, this is already evident in the conceptualisation of genetic 
information as familial rather than individual in contrast to other forms of medical 
information. With gamete donation, we can see that the interests of the gamete 
donor to anonymity and of the infertile couple to privacy which characterised 
gamete donation in the early stages of IVF have been replaced with a new set of 
priorities which focus on the rights of the child conceived as a result of the use of 
donated gametes. The establishment of registers of information about the various 
parties and the gradual extension of rights of access to that information clearly 
illustrates this point. 
However, the move towards openness is not absolute. Despite clear evidence 
of the trend away from secrecy and anonymity and towards openness, consent 
requirements can be seen as a limiting factor. In Victoria, for example, the new 
Victorian Act will allow a donor-conceived person to consent (or withhold their 
consent) to the release of their identifying information to the donor.65 A similar 
provision exists in the new Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2007 (NSW) 
(‘NSW Act’).66 The legislation in South Australia and Western Australia also 
requires consent from an individual before identifying information about them 
can be released.67 The consent requirements can be seen as part of a balancing 
of the interests of the various parties and a refl ection of the transitional nature of 
changes in this area. Despite the limitations imposed by consent requirements, 
there is a clear recognition of the importance of biological information for parties 
involved in assisted reproduction, particularly in the context of information 
about biological parentage for knowledge of inherited conditions or at least 
predisposition to inherited conditions. Genetics is at the heart of this trend 
towards openness. For example, in the NSW Act, the health interests of the child 
63 Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) s 5(c).
64 For discussion see Louise Johnson and Helen Kane, ‘Regulation of Donor Conception and the “Time to 
Tell” Campaign’ (2007) 15 Journal of Law and Medicine 117.
65 Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) s 58.
66 Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2007 (NSW) s 39(2).
67 Reproductive Technology (Code of Ethical Clinical Practice) Regulations 1995 (SA) cl 36; Human 
Reproductive Technology Act 1991 (WA) s 49(2).
Monash University Law Review (Vol 35, No 2)308
become the primary consideration with the legislation providing that a parent will 
be able to apply for access to identifying information about the donor 
if the disclosure of that information is reasonably necessary to save the 
life of the child or to prevent serious damage to the child’s physical or 
psychological health and the information cannot reasonably be obtained 
by the parent in any other way.68 
If the disclosure is to prevent serious harm to the child’s psychological health, the 
Director-General must not authorise the disclosure ‘unless a registered medical 
practitioner with expertise in mental health or a registered psychologist has 
certifi ed in writing that the damage is likely to occur unless the disclosure takes 
place’.69 
There is also recognition of the importance of information about biological 
parentage to the identity of children conceived using donated gametes. 
Interestingly, in some jurisdictions, the interest in having knowledge about 
biological relatives is recognised as being broader than simply that of parent and 
child. According to the Victorian Act, a person descended from a donor-conceived 
person is able to apply for information held in the Register,70 while the NSW 
Act will allow adult donor offspring to apply for information about their donor 
offspring siblings.71 These new provisions, which recognise that familial interests 
extend beyond the circle of the infertile couple, donor and donor offspring, 
provide a more complete understanding of the complex ties and relationships that 
make up our understandings of kinship in contemporary society.
As Janet Dolgin has argued, genetics plays a central role in contemporary 
understandings of the family.72 In choosing to undergo ART procedures in an 
attempt to have a child who is genetically related to at least one member of the 
couple, and perhaps to both of them, prospective parents ‘seem to envision genes 
as a fi t foundation on which to construct familial relationships’.73 The genetic link 
between parent and child is seen as helping to create a family74 that is traditional 
in all respects except for its means of creation. For donor offspring searching 
for their biological (donor) parent, the concept of ‘family’ is ‘constructed around 
suppositions about DNA and little else’.75 There is, as Dolgin points out, no shared 
family history to cement the familial ties.76 Instead, DNA is seen as the binding 
link to donor parents and siblings, although this is hardly surprising given the 
societal value attached to such information.
68 Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2007 (NSW) s 38(1)(c).
69 Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2007 (NSW) s 38(3).
70 Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) s 60.
71 Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2007 (NSW) s 37.
72 Dolgin, above n 8.
73 Ibid 370.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid 386. 
76 Ibid.
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Through the development of registers and statutory provisions for access to 
information we are seeing a clear transition from secrecy to openness in the 
context of access to information about biological parentage in ART programs. 
As with disclosure of genetic information within the family where we have seen 
a transition from medical information as personal to one that recognises broader 
rights, so too with donor conception we are seeing a move away from a focus on 
the rights of parents and donors to privacy and towards openness and recognition 
of the interests of donor offspring to information about their biological parentage.
IV SAVIOUR SIBLINGS
One of the other ways in which genetics and reproductive technologies are 
reshaping our understandings of personal relationships is in the area of using 
these technologies to exercise choice over the characteristics of our offspring.77 
Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (‘PGD’) is the genetic testing of IVF embryos 
by removing one or more cells of the embryo and testing them in order to 
determine whether the embryo is suitable for transfer to the woman. Only those 
embryos that do not have the genetic disorder or condition will be transferred 
to the woman. It is used primarily to identify the sex of the embryo in relation 
to sex-linked inherited conditions such as muscular dystrophy or haemophilia; 
single gene disorders such as fragile X syndrome, cystic fi brosis and Huntington’s 
disease; and to detect chromosomal imbalances in cases of recurrent implantation 
failure or recurrent miscarriage.78 PGD has also been used to select against the 
genetic mutation associated with early-onset Alzheimer’s disease,79 and in the 
UK the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (‘HFEA’) has decided 
to permit, in principle, PGD to be used to test for inherited breast, bowel and 
ovarian cancers.80
The use of PGD means that couples who already have a family history of inherited 
disease are spared the emotional diffi culties associated with having to decide 
whether to terminate affected pregnancies. Without the use of PGD, these couples 
would be faced with diffi cult choices if they wished to avoid having a child affected 
by the genetic condition. They could, for example, decide to avoid pregnancy; 
perhaps, to adopt children; to use donated gametes (sperm or eggs) instead of 
the gametes of the affected partner; or to become pregnant and to use prenatal 
77 Isabel Karpin and Belinda Bennett, ‘Genetic Technologies and the Regulation of Reproductive Decision-
making in Australia’ (2006) 14 Journal of Law and Medicine 127.
78 ITA, Approved Genetic Testing (2009) [List B] PGD Schedule – September 2009 <http://www.ita.org.
au/www/257/1001127/search.asp?frombox=true&searchstring=schedule+of+Approved+Genetic+Testi
ng&selecttype=1> at 3 October 2009. See also Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic) s 8(3)(b).
79 Yury Verlinsky et al, ‘Preimplantation Diagnosis for Early-onset Alzheimer Disease Caused by V717L 
Mutation’ (2002) 287 Journal of the American Medical Association 1018.
80 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (‘HFEA’), Authority Decision on the Use of PGD for 
Lower Penetrance, Later Onset Inherited Conditions (2006) HFEA, <http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/
The_Authority_decision_Choices_and_boundaries.pdf> at 3 October 2009. See also David Cram 
and Adrianne Pope, ‘Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: Current and Future Perspectives’ (2007) 15 
Journal of Law and Medicine 36, 40.
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diagnosis and then decide whether to terminate affected pregnancies. Despite its 
advantages, PGD raises concerns about its potential eugenic effects and about
the rights of parents to choose the characteristics of their children,81 the 
seriousness of the genetic conditions to be tested for, and the scope of laws 
permitting PGD.82 Given the choice inherent in PGD, there is debate as to whether
parents, when choosing between embryos, have a duty to choose those which
would have the best possible life – a duty that Savulescu calls ‘procreative 
benefi cence’83 – and whether parents should be allowed to use PGD for 
‘negative enhancement’.84 The core issue here is the scope of parental decision-
making power to utilise genetic and reproductive technologies in relation to the 
characteristics of their (future) children. 
The ability of parents to select characteristics of their offspring through the use of 
PGD resonates with the value contemporary society places on individual autonomy 
and choice, particularly, consumer choice.85 In this context, genetics is seen not 
so much as the basis for familial connections, but rather as the foundation for an 
individual’s characteristics.86 Here genetics may serve to destabilise traditional 
understandings of the role of the family in childrearing:
A serious instability can be found at the center of families defi ned 
through one generation’s autonomous (self-conscious) choices about 
another generation’s DNA. Perhaps most troubling, the locus of familial 
responsibility may shift away from parents as guides and role models 
towards DNA as the presumed arbiter of social behaviour.87
PGD can also be combined with Human Leukocyte Antigen (‘HLA’) matching to 
conceive a child who would be both unaffected and a matched tissue donor for an 
existing affected child. For example, it was used for a couple who had a six-year-
old child with Fanconi anaemia: the parents wanted to conceive an unaffected 
child who would, once born, be a matched cord blood donor for their sick child.88 
81 Bennett, above n 11, ch 4; Isabel Karpin and Belinda Bennett, ‘Freedom to Choose? Embryo Selection, 
Reproductive Decision-making and the Role of the State’ (2008) 88 Precedent 4; Michael Sandel, The 
Case against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic Engineering (2007).
82 Rosamund Scott, ‘Choosing between Possible Lives: Legal and Ethical Issues in Preimplantation Genetic 
Diagnosis’ (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 153; Rosamund Scott et al, ‘The Appropriate 
Extent of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: Health Professionals’ and Scientists’ Views on the 
Requirements for a “Signifi cant Risk of a Serious Genetic Condition”’ (2007) 15 Medical Law Review 
320; Estair Van Wagner, Roxanne Mykitiuk and Jeff Nisker, ‘The “Affected” Post-preimplantation 
Genetic Diagnosis Embryo’ in Belinda Bennett, Terry Carney and Isabel Karpin (eds), The Brave New 
World of Health (2008) 37.
83 Julian Savulescu, ‘Procreative Benefi cence: Why We Should Select the Best Children’ (2001) 15 
Bioethics 413. Cf Michael Parker, ‘The Best Possible Child’ (2007) 33 Journal of Medical Ethics 279; 
Robert Sparrow, ‘Procreative Benefi cence, Obligation and Eugenics’ (2007) 3 Genomics, Society and 
Policy 43. See also Julian Savulescu, ‘In Defence of Procreative Benefi cence’ (2007) 33 Journal of 
Medical Ethics 284.
84 Isabel Karpin, ‘Choosing Disability: Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis and Negative Enhancement’ 
(2007) 15 Journal of Law and Medicine 89.
85 Dolgin above n 8, 378.
86 Ibid 371.
87 Ibid 379.
88 Yury Verlinksy et al, ‘Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis for Fanconi Anemia Combined with HLA 
Matching’ (2001) 285 Journal of the American Medical Association 3130.
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It is also possible to use HLA testing to select HLA-matched offspring without 
PGD of a causative gene when an existing child has a bone marrow failure 
requiring compatible stem cell transplantation.89 The idea of conceiving a child 
who is destined to be a tissue donor for an affected sibling is controversial and 
raises some interesting questions for legal regulation.90 Should parents be allowed 
to choose the characteristics of their children in this way? If a child is conceived 
to be a compatible donor for a sibling, does this somehow limit the future for that 
child? Is this the wrong reason to have a child? And, importantly for lawyers, 
does the state have a role in regulating decisions in this area? 
Evident within the statutory provisions and guidelines in this area are three key 
considerations: (1) the interests of the child to be born are paramount; (2) PGD 
with HLA matching should only be used for serious, life-threatening conditions; 
and (3) the use of PGD with HLA matching should be limited to situations where 
the child to be born will be a sibling for the affected child. That is, that these 
technologies should not be used to benefi t family members other than siblings, 
thus avoiding the potential for intergenerational confl icts of interest that might 
arise if, for example, a child were created for the benefi t of an affected parent. 
These considerations are refl ected in the NHMRC Guidelines, which currently 
require that clinics
12.3  Seek advice before using PGD to select an embryo with compatible 
tissue for a sibling
  Except in the case of siblings, PGD must not be used to select a 
child to be born with compatible tissue for use by another person. 
  When requested to select an embryo with tissues compatible with 
a sibling of a child to be born, clinics must seek advice from a 
clinical ethics committee (or relevant state or territory regulatory 
agency). 
12.3.1 The ethics committee or relevant agency should ascertain that:
 ●  the use of PGD will not adversely affect the welfare and 
interests of the child who may be born;
 ●  the medical condition of the sibling to be treated is life-
threatening;
 ●  other means to manage the condition are not available; and
 ●  the wish of the parents to have another child as an addition to 
their family and not merely as a source of tissue.91
89 Yury Verlinksy et al, ‘Preimplantation HLA Testing’ (2004) 291 Journal of the American Medical 
Association 2079. See Cram and Pope, above n 80, 41.
90 Belinda Bennett, ‘Symbiotic Relationships: Saviour Siblings, Family Rights and Biomedicine’ (2005) 
19 Australian Journal of Family Law 195; Sally Sheldon and Stephen Wilkinson, ‘Should Select Saviour 
Siblings Be Banned?’ (2004) 30 Journal of Medical Ethics 533; Katrien Devolder, ‘Preimplantation 
HLA Typing: Having Children to Save Our Loved Ones’ (2005) 31 Journal of Medical Ethics 582; 
Susan Wolf, Jeffrey Kahn and John Wagner, ‘Using Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis to Create a Stem 
Cell Donor: Issues, Guidelines & Limits’ (2003) 31 Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 327.
91 NHMRC, above n 50, [12.3.1].
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In Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia the effect of the legislation 
is to prevent the use of PGD and tissue typing solely to create a tissue-matched 
child for an affected sibling. In other words, PGD and HLA could be used to 
ensure that the embryo selected is free of the genetic disease in question, and 
the tissue typing will ensure that the child, once born, will be a matched donor.92 
However, PGD could not be used in the absence of concern over transmission of 
a genetic condition. The NSW Act does not address the use of PGD, leaving the 
NHMRC Guidelines to govern this area. The new NSW Act also does not address 
eligibility criteria for ART treatment and unlike Victoria, South Australia and 
Western Australia does not require individuals to be infertile or at risk of passing 
on a genetic condition in order to be able to access ART. Accordingly, the NSW 
Act leaves open the possibility that couples could seek to use PGD purely for 
tissue typing purposes93 and so allowing the creation of a tissue-matched child 
who is sick with a non-genetic condition.
The issues surrounding ‘saviour siblings’ once again highlight the transformative 
potential of genetic and other technologies, with a child’s genetic and biological 
makeup seen as a potential resource for another family member. In contrast to the 
sharing of genetic information within families and access to information about 
biological parentage discussed above, with ‘saviour siblings’ we see a clear shift 
from information to physical biology as the focus of attention. In other words, it 
is not just genetic information that is a benefi t to others, but rather the individual’s 
physical makeup itself that becomes the resource for others.
In one sense, there is nothing particularly new about intra-familial tissue 
donations. Human tissue legislation in Australian jurisdictions permits donation 
of regenerative tissue to a parent or sibling,94 or to a family member or relative,95 
while donations to others generally are not permitted.96 This system thus 
recognises that medical interests are shared between close family members and 
92 Infertility Treatment Authority, Tissue Typing in Conjunction with Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis 
(2004); Reproductive Technology (Clinical Practices) Act 1995 (SA) s 13(3)(b)(ii); Human Reproductive 
Technology Act 1991 (WA) ss 7, 14(2)(b); Western Australia Reproductive Technology Council, 
Policy on Approval of Diagnostic Procedures Involving Embryos (2008). See Michelle Taylor-Sands, 
‘Selecting “Saviour Siblings”: Reconsidering the Regulation in Australia of Pre-implantation Genetic 
Diagnosis in Conjunction with Tissue Typing’ (2007) 14 Journal of Law and Medicine 551, 558-9. 
93 Taylor-Sands, above n 92, 560; Smith, above n 49, 129.
94 Human Tissue Act 1983 (NSW) s 10; Human Tissue Act 1982 (Vic) s 15; Transplantation and Anatomy 
Act 1979 (Qld) s 12B. 
95 Human Tissue and Transplantation Act 1982 (WA) s 13; Human Tissue Act 1985 (Tas) s 12; 
Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1978 (ACT) s 13. In these jurisdictions the legislation permits 
transplantation to ‘the body of another member of the family or to the body of a relative of the child’. In 
the Northern Territory the Human Tissue Transplant Act (NT) does not contain any provisions relating 
to donation of tissue by children, suggesting that donations by children are not permitted in the Northern 
Territory.
96 As indicated above, most Australian States and Territories limit transplantations of regenerative tissue 
removed from children to use for the benefi t of a sibling, immediate family member or relative of the 
child. In South Australia the Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1983 (SA) s 13 permits donations of 
regenerative tissue by a child and does not limit such donations to immediate family members, instead 
allowing ‘transplantation of the tissue to the body of another living person referred to in the consent’: 
s 13(1). However, the consent to the removal of the tissue must be approved by a Ministerial Committee: 
s 13(3). 
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that the chance of donor compatibility is much higher for close relatives than it is 
for the general population.97 What is special about the ‘saviour sibling’ situation 
is that an individual is created for the benefi t of another family member and that 
the individual self-ownership that we regard as an integral part of the self is, from 
the outset, reconfi gured as familial.
Through the development and use of PGD we are seeing the transformation of 
reproduction through genetic technologies. Although PGD is only utilised in 
relation to IVF embryos and its social impact is arguably limited, the combination 
of genetic and reproductive technologies does alter the reproductive landscape 
in new ways so as to give parents unprecedented power over their prospective 
children in ways that do transform our understandings of the self. 
V TRANSFORMING THE PERSONAL
Each of the above examples – of genetic privacy, of access to information about 
biological parentage in the context of gamete donation, and of the use of PGD to 
select the characteristics of future offspring – reveals the ways in which genetic 
information is impacting upon contemporary understandings of the personal and 
the boundaries between us and others. Discussion of genetics often focuses on 
the individual and the specifi cs of genetic difference. Genetic information is, 
therefore, that which marks us as individual, unique and different. Yet, as the 
above discussion shows, genetic information also tells a different story; one that 
is communal, linked and similar. It is through our genetics that we are linked 
to others – through our genes that are not ours alone, but also form part of our 
familial story, past and present, forming the biological bonds that join us to others, 
structuring the family and defi ning – at least in part – who we are and who our 
children will be. Through all of these ways, genetics confi gures us as inherently 
relational. As Nikolas Rose observes:
Genetic identity is thus revealed and established within a web of genetic 
connectedness overlaid upon a web of family bonds and family memories, 
with the burden of mutual obligations and caring commitments, and with 
all the ethical dilemmas they entail.98
This connectedness has implications for the law. As discussed above, the relational 
aspects of genetic information present new challenges for legal understandings 
of the self. Through its inherent relatedness, genetic information presents a 
fundamental shift in the conceptualisation of the realm of the personal and of the 
self. This shift is apparent because the realm of the personal in liberal legalism 
is precisely that – personal. The singularity of the autonomous legal person is 
at the heart of the Western legal tradition and its understanding of rights and 
97 A sibling has a 1:4 chance of being a compatible bone marrow donor for a sick sibling: Children’s 
Cancer Centre, ‘Types of Bone Marrow Transplants’ (2009) Royal Children’s Hospital Melbourne 
<www.rch.org.au/ccc/treatments.cfm?doc_id=11595> at 3 October 2009.
98 Rose, above n 7, 111–12.
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entitlements. Genetic information represents the shifting sands undermining this 
tradition. As Karpin notes:
biogenetic discourses, which emphasize shared identity and participation 
in the common genetic pool, reveal the monstrousness in all of us. This is 
challenging to law because such discourses expose the impossibility of the 
autonomous, self-suffi cient individual of liberal legalism.99
In this sense, then, genetic information has a transformative potential. It provides 
opportunities for new understandings of the placing of the individual in relation to 
others and, in so doing, stamps us not as the isolated, autonomous individuals of 
liberal legalism but rather as connected, linked and tied to others in ways that can 
be complex, messy and challenging. Genetic information positions the individual 
at the heart of liberal legalism as relational rather than separate and thus demands 
a rethinking of the core premises upon which the dominant discourses of legal 
theory are built. It could be argued that family law also recognises individuals in 
relational ways and that there is nothing inherently new about genetics. Certainly, 
laws relating to marriage, divorce and custody of children are directly concerned 
with the relationships between individuals. The argument in this paper is that 
genetic information moves beyond the relationships between individuals and 
confi gures the individuals themselves as relational, at a genetic level, in ways that 
challenge the construction of the autonomous self within Western legal thought. 
Developments in both modern genetics and reproductive technologies have 
presented, and are continuing to present, a range of new ethical and legal 
challenges in terms of the way we manage personal information and personal 
choices. Information about genetic health, biological parentage, and reproductive 
decision-making touches people’s lives in deeply personal ways. The laws and 
policies governing these areas are complex, and scientifi c advances are often well 
ahead of legal reforms. There is a continuing role for lawyers in ensuring that 
our laws are well-crafted, that they are in keeping with national and international 
developments, and that the rights and interests of those touched by them are fully 
taken into account. As the above discussion shows, genetics is reshaping our 
understandings of the personal in some fundamental ways that present important 
challenges for law and ethics. The question of whose rights and interests are to 
be taken into account (and how that should be done) remains one of the enduring 
challenges for contemporary health law and policy.
99 Isabel Karpin, ‘Genetics and the Legal Conception of Self’ in Margrit Shildrick and Roxanne Mykitiuk 
(eds), Ethics of the Body: Postconventional Challenges (2005) 195, 196.
